Useful onion links: news, email, and Tor sites with their own onion addresses

Updated

The useful onion links are the ones run by organisations you already know: the BBC, ProPublica, Proton Mail, and the Tor Project each operate an onion version of their service and announced its address on their own website. They let you read the news or use your email over Tor without leaving the Tor network, which matters most in countries that block those sites. Every address is printed as plain text to copy into Tor Browser. Anyone can create a lookalike onion address, so check each one against its owner’s own site.

Onion addresses announced by their owners

The BBC News red square logo beside the Tor Project purple onion wordmark, over a blurred news-site background
The BBC launched its onion site in October 2019 for readers in countries that block its news.
Onion services whose owners published the address on their own website
Service What it is for Announced Onion address
The Tor Project The Tor Project’s website, downloads, and documentation, without leaving Tor onion.torproject.org, the Project’s list of its own onions 2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion
BBC News The international news site, including the World Service language editions BBC News, 23 October 2019 bbcweb3hytmzhn5d532owbu6oqadra5z3ar726vq5kgwwn6aucdccrad.onion
ProPublica ProPublica’s investigative journalism, readable without leaving a trail at an exit relay ProPublica, 2016, updated December 2021 p53lf57qovyuvwsc6xnrppyply3vtqm7l6pcobkmyqsiofyeznfu5uqd.onion
Proton Mail Encrypted email, reachable where Proton’s regular site is blocked or watched Proton blog, January 2017 protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion

To use an address, copy it and paste it into the address bar of Tor Browser. It will not open in Chrome, Safari, or any other ordinary browser, which is also why the addresses here are text and not links: clicking an onion link in a normal browser does nothing useful and can send the address to your DNS provider.

Other well-known organisations run onion sites too. Facebook launched one in 2014, the first major company to do so, and The New York Times followed in 2017. Many newsrooms also run SecureDrop, an onion-based system for sources to send documents anonymously; each publishes its SecureDrop address on its own site. The rule for all of them is the same: take the address from the organisation’s own website, not from a list.

What an onion service is

An onion service is a website or other service that can only be reached through Tor. The Tor Project explains that these services use the special .onion domain instead of .com or .org, and that nothing outside the Tor network can resolve them. Their uses go well beyond markets: anonymous publishing, private chat and file sharing, tools that let journalists receive documents from sources, safer software updates, and, as with the sites above, more private ways to reach ordinary websites.

The address itself is unusual. A current, version 3 onion address is 56 characters long, followed by .onion, and those characters are not a chosen name. They are the service’s public key, encoded as text, plus a short checksum and a version number. When Tor Browser connects, it checks that the site holds the private key matching the address. The Tor Project’s overview describes the three properties this gives:

The address proves who you reached
A site can only answer at an onion address if it holds that address’s private key. Nobody can impersonate an onion address the way a fake website can sit on a lookalike domain; they can only create a different address.
The server’s location is hidden
The connection meets in the middle of the Tor network, so neither side learns the other’s IP address. A government blocking a site by IP address has nothing to block.
Everything is encrypted end to end
Traffic stays inside Tor from your browser to the service, without the exit relay that ordinary Tor browsing uses.

The first property has a limit that matters for everything below. The address proves you reached whoever holds that key. It does not prove the key belongs to the BBC. So take the address only from the organisation itself.

Why use a news site’s onion instead of the normal site over Tor

You can open bbc.com in Tor Browser and it works: your traffic leaves the Tor network through an exit relay and reaches the ordinary site. An onion version is better in three ways. Your traffic never leaves Tor, so no exit relay sees which site you requested. The site cannot be blocked by IP address, because it does not have a public one. And the address authenticates itself, so a censor cannot quietly redirect you to a fake. Steven Murdoch, a security researcher quoted in the BBC’s announcement, put it this way: onion services “take load off scarce exit nodes, preserve end-to-end encryption [and] the self-authenticating domain name resists spoofing.”

The BBC launched its onion for audiences in countries where its news is blocked, naming China, Iran, and Vietnam, as part of the World Service’s mission. ProPublica launched in 2016 so readers could follow its reporting without leaving a record at their internet provider or an exit relay. Proton started its onion in 2017 because encrypted email services were being blocked in several countries. The Tor Project encourages other newsrooms to do the same, citing cases such as Egypt blocking Human Rights Watch in 2017.

How to check that an onion address is real

Onion addresses cannot be read or remembered, which is exactly what fake ones exploit. A phishing copy of a site gets its own address, and the copy’s address can be made to look almost identical to the real one.

An illustration of a hooded figure at a laptop, a gold trophy with a star ribbon, a purple onion, and faint binary in the background
Onion addresses are copied as text and compared character by character.

The trick is called a vanity address. Because an onion address comes from a key, anyone can generate keys over and over until one produces an address that starts with the characters they want. Matching the first six or seven characters of a real site’s address takes ordinary hardware and modest time. Matching all 56 is impossible. So a phishing address usually begins exactly like the real one and differs somewhere in the middle or at the end, where people stop looking.

  1. Get the address from the owner. For the services above, that means the BBC’s, ProPublica’s, Proton’s, or the Tor Project’s own website. A search result, a forum post, or a directory titled “official onion” is not the owner.
  2. Compare every character. Check the whole address against the owner’s published version. A matching beginning is exactly what a vanity address is built to give you, so it proves nothing on its own.
  3. Save it once you have it. Bookmark the address in Tor Browser after checking it, and use the bookmark. Most people who land on a phishing copy got there by searching for an address they had already found once.
  4. Let the checksum catch typos, not fakes. The last characters of a v3 address include a checksum, so Tor Browser rejects an address with a typo in it. That protects against mistakes, not against a deliberately generated fake, which has a valid checksum of its own.
  5. Prefer signed announcements. Services that change addresses often, such as forums, publish new ones in a message signed with their PGP key. If you saved the key earlier, you can verify the message; if you did not, you have no safe way to trust a new address from a stranger.

Old onion addresses were 16 characters long. These version 2 addresses used weaker cryptography, and Tor stopped supporting them in October 2021. Any site still listing a 16-character address is years out of date.

What a status directory such as dark.fail does, and where it stops

A status directory is a clearnet or onion page that reports which onion services are reachable and lists their addresses. The best-known example, dark.fail, describes itself on its own homepage as a resource “intended for researchers only” that does “not vouch for any sites.” Its published Onion Mirror Guidelines set out how an operator can prove an address is official: a list of allowed PGP keys, a PGP-signed list of official mirrors, and a signed canary message, refreshed every 14 days, that proves the operator still controls the key. The guidelines are labelled “version alpha” and date from 2019.

That design solves a real problem, because a phishing address cannot produce a valid signature from a key you already trust. It has three limits. The directory is a single point of failure that has itself been imitated, so a clearnet page claiming to be the directory is checked the same way as any other address. Its operators decide what to list and delist, with no notice to readers. And the signature only helps if you got the verifying key from somewhere independent, which PGP-signed messages explains. We have not used the directory’s listings and do not link to them; this page only covers how mirror verification works, using the operator’s published guidelines.

Why the Hidden Wiki and “best onion sites” lists are a bad source

The Hidden Wiki was a wiki on Tor that anyone could edit after registering. Its main page was a directory of onion sites, and it became the best-known starting point for new Tor users. It was also a mess: its listings included scams, hitman-for-hire pages, and links to child sexual abuse material, which is what first drew press coverage in 2011. In March 2014 its address was hacked and redirected elsewhere, and in November 2014 police seized one version during Operation Onymous. Since then there has been no single Hidden Wiki, only copies and forks, each claiming to be the original.

The problem with any editable list of addresses is simple. Whoever controls the list controls where readers go. Changing one character in a popular entry sends everyone who trusts the list to a phishing copy, and nobody notices until they lose something. Many clearnet sites that call themselves the Hidden Wiki or rank “best onion sites” are run for exactly that purpose, or for the advertising that comes with search traffic. The same pattern runs through market link lists, as the darknet markets page describes.

A useful onion site meets three tests: a real organisation runs it, it has a public-interest reason to exist, and you can read the announcement of its address on the organisation’s regular website without Tor. The services in the table meet all three.

How we know this

Each address in the table is one that the organisation announced itself, and the announcement is linked on the same row. We have not connected to any of these services, so their presence here is not a statement that they are working today. The check to run is the one this page explains: compare an address with the publisher’s own announcement. Our editorial standards cover the wider rules.